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Project Investment Decision-Making
Domen Zavrl*
Abstract: Project evaluation is the control of the planning and implementation of project activities
with regard to the objectives to be achieved. In this paper we assume the objective to be
efficient outcome and profit maximization. This means that project evaluation puts
normative assessments into the context of planning and management and hence into the
context of intentional action and cycles of action. The model for project evaluation we
propose has two money holders who must decide how to invest their money in two
investment funds (financial intermediaries) that, in turn, will use the money to bid to acquire
ownership in two projects. The general case when the number of money holders, the number
of funds, and the number of investments are arbitrary may be handled in a similar manner to
the development below, but at a cost of greater complexity. As a result no mechanism to
achieve the maximum outcome is present and different methods to find optimal structure
under uncertainty and different cost structures are discussed.
Keywords: project evaluation, profit maximization, uncertainty, coordination failure
JEL Classification: G31
Introduction
The model for project evaluationwepropose has two money holders who must decide
how to invest their money in two investment funds that, in turn, will use the money to
bid to acquire ownership in two projects. Importantly, the profitability of each project
depends on the specific joint ownership structure that results from the money which
each MIF receives, as the funds are assumed to have different management
capabilities.
We start by assuming that N 0money points are owned by the population which




. Money holder I
l
, l = 1, 2, has V
l
0 money
points whereV V N
1 2
  . The number of money points held by each individual may
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differ to allow the possibility of pre-auction trading. Each I
l
must decide
independently on the number of money points to invest in each of two money funds,
F j
j
1 2, . The number of money points that I
l







, with the remainingV x
1
 money points being allocated to F
2
.











 being invested in F
2
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of the profit of F
2
. The general case
when the number of money holders, the number of funds, and the number of
investments are arbitrary may be handled in a similar manner to the development
below, but at a cost of greater complexity.
At the outset, neither F
j





reveals information useful to the I
l
. We assume that this information relates
to the cost structure of the F
j
. Specifically,weassume that each F
j
announces that its
costs will be a fixed proportion of the revenues it will earn by investing the money
points that it will acquire. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that the
















is the revenue received by F
j
as a result of the bidding game in which,






, compete to acquire share in the
projects offered for financing. The
j
can be thought of as the proportion of revenue
that the F
j
promise to distribute to the share holders. R x y
1
( ) depends on x+ y since
this is the number of money points available to F
1
for investment in projects.
Similarly, R x y
2
( ) has the same dependence since the total number of money
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chooses y to maximize m
2
. We refer to the




as the money investment problem
(MIP). In what follows,we take x and y to be continuous over their respective ranges.
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The R x y
j









play a non-cooperative game in which they
submit bids to acquire shares in company i, we 1 2, . Each F
j
submits a money point
bid of a
ij
in company where a
ij




 . As a consequence of the
bidding, each F
j

















2 , we = 1, 2, depend on p
ij
, j =1,2, that is,weassume
that the F
j
have different skills in managing and restructuring the projects in which
they have acquired share, and that the impact of their skills on the profit of a given
project depends on the proportion of ownership that they achieve in the project as a
result of the bidding game.
Furthermore,we assume, for tractability, that the profit functions 
i i i
p p( , )
1 2
can
be reasonably approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion. It follows, since
p p
i i1 1
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In the remainder of the paper we use the notation k
12 1
0 1 ( , ); k
21 2







































for j i .
In summary, we assume that the profit function can be written as;

i ij ii i ij ii i
k p k p r    ( )1 for i j , i, j=1,2
The parameter k
12
represents the profit that project 1 would make if it were totally
purchased by F
2
. The parameter k
21
has a similar interpretation. The parameter 
1





, in managing project 1. The parameter 
2
has a similar interpretation. Thus, 
1
is
modeled as the sum of the value that would occur if F
2
were to manage project 1









, have the same
differential impact on 
1
, the value of the profit function would be the same
regardless of how ownership were shared.
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We note that since the p
ii
depend on x + y , the 
i
depend on x + y also. For
subsequent use, we define 
i ij i
z k z( )    . Thus, after having submitted their bids,
F
j
receives the revenue p p p p
j j1 1 11 2 2 22
 ( ) ( ) .
The revenue accruing to F
j
at the Nash equilibrium of the bidding game is what












We assume that both I
l
share the same information set concerning the projects







, the results of the bidding game between the F
j
, are required by the I
l
to
solve their problem,we investigate this bidding game first.
The Money Fund Problem






, and given the bids of F
j '
, j j' , F
j
must choose its bids to maximize its














 0 and a N
iji j








. I refer to these programs
as the money fund problem (VFP).
The Lagrangian for F
1
is:
L p p p p a a N
1 11 1 11 21 2 22 1 11 21 1
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Similarly, the Lagrangian for F
2
is:
L p p p p a a N
2 12 1 11 22 2 22 2 12 22 2
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 11, . For any
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z z z z z z
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 11, , there exists a Nash equilibrium of the




* , and* be the solutions to the equations
of lemma 1 corresponding to   N N
1
. Then, under the stated conditions, the
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unique solution to equations (1)-(6), i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the VFP for i, j =
1,2 and j i is:
a K z z a K z z K
ii i i i ij i i i
* * * * * * *( ), ( ) ( ), ,    1 1
1








1 1 2 2
( ) ( )* *
It is useful to highlight a result established in the proof of Theorem 1 signifying
the proportion of each project owned by each fund.wedo this in the next corollary. In
what follows, an asterisk above any function denotes that function evaluated at the
solution to the VFP presented in Theorem 1.
Corollary 1








as the resulting value per money in project I, Theorem 1
establishes that these values are the same for both projects at the Nash equilibrium of
the bidding game. Furthermore, this common value is equal to the economy-wide
value of a money given by ( )* * 
1 2
 N . This common value of a money is also
equal to the sum of the two shadow prices that is denoted by K in Theorem 1. An











, would receive *
percent of this additional amount, and F
2
the remainder, 1 * where *











   
* * * *( ( ) money points are




* percent of these money
points.wecan interpret this total either as the part of the outstanding number of money
points acquired by company j being proportional to 
j
* , or as the profit of project j
denominated in units of economy-wide value per money. Although the money
investment in projectwedepends on
j
* , this profit cannot be known in advance since
it depends on the composition of ownership resulting from the bidding game itself.
Finally, the ratio a a p p z z
ii ij ii ij i i
* * * * * *( )  1 , j i depends on all the parameters
of the problem including the skill levels of the F
j
. We next establish the revenue that






At the Nash equilibrium of the VFP, the revenue to F
j




The solution to the VPF yields each F
j
the proportion N N
j
of the sum of the
profits produced by projects 1 and 2 at the Nash solution. This establishes that
R N N N
j j




and that profit equals
j j
N N( ) *

. It also follows that at
the Nash equilibrium, the revenue per money for each of the F
j
is identical. We can
now return to the problem facing the I
l
, the original money holders.
The Money Investment Problem
For the money investment problem (MIP) in which I
l




must know R x y
1
( ) and R x y
2
( ) . From Corollary 2 and the remarks following it,
R p p N N
j j j j
  
1 1 2 2




. Having assumed that
each I
l




conditional on the funds having N x y
1
  money points, and N N N
2 1
  money
points, respectively, it follows that each I
l
also knows the Nash equilibrium of the
VFP as presented in Theorem 1. Consequently, the respective objective functions of
the I
l
















































Since N x y
1
  and N N N
2 1
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We next define an efficient allocation of money points. Let
 
N N
N N1 0 11
*
,
*arg max ( )


. Note that N
1
* is an apportionment of money points
to the VPFs that achieves the maximum total profit.
Definition 1
An allocation of money points
   
( , ), , , ,x y x V y V 0 0
1 2
, is an efficient allocation
if x y N 
1
* .
The case when   
1 2
  . We continue by investigating the case in which the F
j
pay out the same proportion of their revenues to the I
l
; that is the case when
  
1 2




( ) ( )* . Since increasing




it is in their joint interest to achieve the largest possible
*

by their respective money investments. It follows that it is in the interest of the
I
l
to choose their money investments x * and y * , respectively, such that x y N* * * 
1
i.e., to choose their investments to be efficient. It also follows that there exists an








y V* , 0
2





  there exists an infinity of equilibria to the MIP consisting of the set
of efficient allocations.
But despite the fact that the I
l
find it in their interest to have x y N* * * 
1
, the
non-cooperative nature of the Nash game offers no mechanism to cause the target N
1
*
to be met. Since the target represents the division of the total number of money points
in the system between the F
j
that maximizes economy-wide profit, there is
consequently no mechanism to achieve this efficient outcome. Thus, the failure to
achieve efficiency is the result of the absence of coordination between the money
holders.
Notice that this coordination failure is present even in the case in which the money
point holders have identical and full information, and have as their goal the wish to
allocate their money points in a manner consistent with the maximization of
economy-wide profit.wenow show that the introduction of uncertainty exacerbates
the situation since it creates a situation in which the goal of the money holders is no
longer one of maximizing total economy-wide profit; in fact,weshow that the goal
differs for the different money point holders.
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When uncertainty is present,wemust consider the investors’ attitudes toward risk.





with u m m
l l l l l
( ) exp( ),   1 0  be the utility
function of I
l
. We assume that all information is known to the money point holders as
before, with one exception: 
1





as a random variable, distributed normally with mean 
1
(as before) and variance 2 . We denote this density as ( , )
1





     k k p p
12 21 11 1 22 2









  with * as before. Let
N E N
N N1 1 1 1
* * *( ) max max ( )





has utility function u m m
l l l l l
( ) exp( ),   1 0  ;
I
l







is distributed as  ( , )
1
2 ;
All other information is known with certainty;
Both I
l




In what follows, we let N
11








In the presence of uncertainty about the difference in the differential impact of the
funds’ skills on the profit of company 1, and if F
1
, is expected, but uncertain, to be
more skilled than F
2
in managing company 1, then risk-averse money holders
allocate fewer money points to F
2
compared to the certainty case, and more money
points to resulting in an inefficient allocation of money points among the funds. In
particular, let Assumption A hold. Let  
1 1 2 2 1
0V V , and N N
1
0* ( ) ( , )  . Then
there exists a constant c such that for  2
11 12 11 1




* ( ) .
We see from Theorem 3 that the immediate impact or the introduction of
uncertainty regarding the relative skills of the funds on the profit of company 1
causes a shifting of money points away from F
1
. As a consequence, even if N
1
* ( )
were close to N , F
2
would receive more money points as the uncertainty increases.
Earlier we showed that when  
1 2
 and when all information was known with
certainty, each I
l
strove to achieve the target N
1
* , which, if achieved, would
maximize the money holders’ respective wealths as well as implement the efficient
outcome. That is, the money holders were aiming at the right target; a coordination
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failure, however, prevented them from achieving it. This suggested that had a
coordination mechanism existed, the efficient allocation would have been
implemented. Now, with the introduction of uncertainty into the model, we see that
the target at which the I
l
aim is not the optimal value N
1
* ( ) and the I
l
may have
different targets, both unequal to N
1
* ( ) . Coordination would not resolve this
inefficiency. Though we introduced uncertainty only in regard to 
!
, any broader
introduction of uncertainty would have further exacerbated the problem. It is not
surprising that the introduction of uncertainty results in a sub-optimal solution.
However,wenext show that even with certainty and with complete information, when
the payouts of the funds to the differ, inefficiency also results.
The case when  
1 2
 . We have assumed so far that the F
j
have identical cost
structures. Generally, however, since the F
j
are not identical, they could have
different cost structures, leading them to select different percentages of their
revenues to pay out, that is,  
1 2
 . When  
1 2
 , it is no longer true that the I
l
will both benefit by seeking to maximize * since the share of * that I
l
receives
depends, in this case, on the investments x* and y*. Importantly, for the case 
1 2
 ,




, respectively, need not always produce
a division of the money points consistent with the maximization of economy-wide
profit. We show these results to be true in Theorem 4, where we present the solution
to the VIP when  
1 2
 . To make this point as starkly as possible, we let .
Theorem 4
Even with certainty and even if the money holders start with the same number of
money points, when the payouts of the funds differ, the unique Nash equilibrium of
the VIP leads to a common inefficient target. In particular, let  
1 2
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where either N N
1
0  ( , ) and satisfies G N( )
1
0  or N
1
0  or N.
If 
j
 0 for at least one value of j and N N
1











, yielding a total of N
1

money points to F
1










, and thus will not maximize total economy-wide profit. Additionally,
whereas a coordination failure between the I
l
is responsible for inefficient outcomes
when  
1 2
 , even permitting coordination when  
1 2
 would not result in an
efficient outcome. That is, when  
1 2
 , the goal of the money holders is not the
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